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Emails Can Satisfy the Signature Requirement of the Statute of Frauds

Every once in a while, I actually do go on vacation.  So, my colleague, Alan E. Lipkind, a partner in the Business Litigation and Real Estate groups at Burns & Levinson, has contributed this post on the recent decision by a Massachusetts court finding email communications can satisfy the signature requirement in the Statute of Frauds.

 

Most of us know the basics of the Statute of Frauds: Certain contracts, including those pertaining to real estate, goods worth more than $500, and guarantees, as well as those that can’t be performed within one year, must be in writing and signed in order to be binding.  In a recent case where I represented prospective purchasers of real property, the Massachusetts Superior Court found that an email exchange among parties pursuing a real estate purchase transaction satisfied the signature requirement embodied in the Statute of Frauds. 

In Feldberg v. Coxall, buyers’ counsel emailed to seller’s counsel a proposed offer to purchase real estate which included a financing contingency.  The next day, the seller emailed buyer’s counsel directly, stating that if a written approval letter from the buyer’s lender was received by 5 p.m., “I think we are ready … Keep reading